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Abstract
Government based Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have been criticized for not
maximizing environmental effectiveness through appropriate targeting, while instead priori-
tizing social side-objectives. In Mexico, existing literature on how the Payments for Ecosys-
tem Services-Hydrological program (PSA-H) has targeted deforestation and forest
degradation shows that both the process of identifying the eligible areas and the choice of
the selection criteria for enrolling forest parcels have been under the influence of competing
agendas. In the present paper we study the influence of the PSA-H multi-level governance
on the environmental effectiveness of the program–the degree to which forest at high risk of
deforestation is enrolled- building from a “policyscape” framework. In particular, we combine
governance analysis with two distinct applications of the policyscape framework: First, at
national level we assess the functional overlap between the PSA-H and other environmen-
tal and rural programs with regard to the risk of deforestation. Second, at regional level in
the states of Chiapas and Yucatan, we describe the changing policy agenda and the role of
technical intermediaries in defining the temporal spatialization of the PSA-H eligible and
enrolled areas with regard to key socio-economic criteria. We find that, although at national
level the PSA-H program has been described as coping with both social and environmental
indicators thanks to successful adaptive management, our analysis show that PSA-H is
mainly found in communities where deforestation risk is low and in combination with other
environmental programs (protected areas and forest management programs). Such inertia
is reinforced at regional level as a result of the eligible areas’ characteristics and the behav-
iour of technical intermediaries, which seek to minimise transaction costs and sources of
uncertainty. Our project-specific analysis shows the importance of integrating the gover-
nance of a program in the policyscape framework as a way to better systematize complex
interactions at different spatial and institutional scales between policies and landscape
characteristics.
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Introduction
Mexico has been one of the pioneer Latin American countries to have implemented a nation-
wide Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) program, here referred as the Payment for Ecosys-
tem Services-Hydrological program (PSA-H), to protect critical forests for water provision and
regulation services [1]. The program started in 2003 and has been successful in incorporating a
large area of diverse type of forests–more than 2 million hectares of forests from conifer to low-
land rainforests have been enrolled since 2003. Payments are granted for 5 years on a yearly
basis to forest communities after the signature of a contract between community elected leaders
and the Mexico’s National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR). Forest communities in Mexico
are composed by ejidos (collective lands granted to modern settlers) and traditional communi-
ties: We use the term communities to signify both. Private owners can also be contracted but
represent a minority of the total number of beneficiaries. So far, PSA-H impact evaluation liter-
ature has focussed on the impact of on forest cover, with current findings estimating that the
program helped to reduce the expected land-cover loss by 41–50% while also generating small
but positive poverty alleviation [2,3]. When it comes to the capacity of the program to target
both environmental and social objectives, which stand as the main institutional priorities of the
program, existing evidence shows mixed results. While some studies argue that CONAFOR
has succeeded in progressively enrolling forest parcels with both a higher deforestation risk
and level of marginality (a Mexican proxy for poverty, http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/
CONAPO/Indices_de_Marginacion_Publicaciones) as a result of an adaptive management
strategy [4], more recent studies indicate that environmental benefits are higher where poverty
is slow and vice versa [3]. The deforestation risk is a spatially explicit indicator available at
national level and developed in 2010 by the National Institute for the Ecology and Climate
Change (INECC) to estimate the probability of a forest pixel to be deforested [4].Overall, the
program has been successful in enrolling and protecting large tracts of forest, but conclusive
evidence is still lacking on the programme’s efficacy at targeting both forest at risk and poor
populations.
Achieving two targets with only one instrument is a policy problem sensitive to the gover-
nance dynamics of program implementation and to the social-ecological characteristics of the
landscape [5]. A mix of policies (i.e. a policymix) is needed when–alike rural Mexico- there are
‘multiple externalities or externalities occurring together with imperfect property rights, mar-
ket power, unobservable behaviour, or imperfect information’ [6]. Environmental policies
account from command-and-control (protected areas), to economic incentives in form of cash
transfers (payments for ecosystem services) and capacity building (forest management support,
community enterprises) among others. The spatial expression of such a policymix can be
defined as a policyscape [7]. Since the risk of deforestation and marginality levels are spatially
explicit and heterogeneously distributed, the capacity of a policymix to achieve both targets
depends on the degree to which it aligns with them spatially. Moreover, for this alignment to
happen, coordination at different governance scales must happen in accordance with adaptive
management principles [8,9].
Indeed, the geographical distribution of a policy depends on its governance dynamics, espe-
cially in countries like Mexico where targeting is politically sensitive and dependant on the
negotiation power of the public and private actors involved [10]. Although some studies have
underscored the way federal governance has influenced the design and effectiveness of PES
programs [4,11], current research has overlooked its implications in terms of a policyscape. In
addition, regional governance dynamics can also determine where a program will come into
action. In particular, the role of technical intermediaries in choosing what forests to enroll
remains largely understudied. Technical intermediaries can have very different interests–e.g.
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when comparing private profit intermediaries with NGOs—and guide the spatialization of PES
programs based on different socio-economic and political rationales [12,13].
In this paper, we confront governance dynamics at federal (national) and regional levels
with the spatial distribution of the PAS-H and other environmental programs in order to
explain the links between the multi-level governance of the programme and its capacity to tar-
get both deforestation and poverty objectives. We build a conceptual framework that combines
governance analysis along two distinct policyscape applications: (i) First, at national level we
compare the outcomes of federal stakeholder negotiations where the selection criteria to enrol
forest parcels were decided with regard to the functional overlap between environmental poli-
cies and the risk of deforestation; (ii) Second, at regional level for the states of Chiapas and
Yucatan, we analyse the spatialization of the PAS-H during the 2005–2010 period in terms of
key socio-economic criteria (e.g. deforestation risk and marginality) with regard to the role
played by the changing political agenda and the structure of incentives from technical
intermediaries.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and the case
study. Section 3 presents the results as a combination of qualitative stakeholder and statistical
analysis at national and regional level. Section 4 discusses the implications of the multi-level
governance in shaping the policyscape with regard to the objective of tackling deforestation
and poverty and the utility of the proposed framework to analyse the spatial outcomes of
multi-level policy processes.
Methods and Case Study
Amulti-level governance analysis implies understanding how government and non-govern-
ment organisations articulate their interests along the policy cycle of a program [14]. A classical
policy cycle sequence includes: (i) The definition of goals and program design; (ii) the identifi-
cation of funding resources; (iii) the implementation of the program; (iv) the evaluation of out-
puts; and (v) the evaluation of outcomes. The first three stages are directly determined by
formal and informal governance networks, where voluble and informal negotiations and alli-
ances take place [15,16]. The policy cycle is closed by a redefinition of policy goals through
renewed institutional negotiation in a similar fashion as the adaptive management cycle [9,17].
The policy cycle of the Mexican PSA-H program is characterised by different governance
spaces at federal and regional levels that coexist in a complex organisational architecture where
a large number of actors and institutions interact. Such multi-level governance architecture
makes possible the confluence of public and private actors that intervene at three different
phases of program implementation: the definition of the eligible areas, the selection criteria for
enrolling forest parcels, and the final selection of proposals (Fig 1). Eligible areas correspond to
areas where forest communities can apply to the program. CONAFOR headquarters draw
these areas using spatially explicit geo-physical (slope, vegetation, hydrological data, forest den-
sity) and socio-economic (presence of large cities, marginality, hydraulic infrastructures) data.
Decision upon how final eligible areas will look like needs the formal approval of forest-related
government bodies, such as the National Commissions for Water (CONAGUA), for Biodiver-
sity (CONABIO) and for Natural Protected Areas (CONANP). Eligible areas are the spatial
corset from which communities can potentially apply to the program. Then, forest parcels sub-
mitted to CONAFOR are classified based on a scoring system of selection criteria decided at
federal level by a multi-stakeholder commission composed of public, private and civil society
representatives [11]. After eligible areas and selection criteria are set, the program is launched
in each state by CONAFOR offices, in charge of administrative procedures. Technical
intermediaries (TI) are the ones to submit the PSA-H dossier and therefore assure the nexus
Spatial Policymix and PES in Mexico
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between CONAFOR state offices and forest communities. Because they play a crucial role at
enrolling communities, their decisions will influence the socio-economic and environmental
characteristics of the areas where the PAS-H is implemented.
To understand the influence of the PSA-H multi-level governance on the resulting policy-
scape we use an analysis framework (Fig 1) that combines qualitative and quantitative research
methods (Table 1). We apply semi-structured interviews for exploring stakeholder behaviour
Fig 1. Analysis framework: Multi-level governance and policyscape dynamics in the PSA-H policy cycle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.g001
Table 1. Summary of the data used in the study and corresponding analysis framework. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of participants
per institution.
Data National questionnaire
of forest rural
communities
Structured interviews with
government and civil society
Yucatan and Chiapas
spatially explicit database
Structured interviews and expert
workshops (EW) in Yucatan and
Chiapas
Year 2011 2012 and 2013 2012 2013
N 324 13 2681 for state-wide analysis 14 (Yucatan), 12 (Chiapas)
Coverage National
representativeness
Federal headquarters in
Guadalajara and Mexico City
Regional: States of Yucatan
and Chiapas
Mérida in Yucatan and Tuxtla-
Gutiérrez in Chiapas
Nature of
respondents by
organization type
Board of rural
communities
CONAFOR Guadalajara (6),
INECC Mexico City (2),CONAGUA
(1), CONANP (1), NGOs part of
national PSA-H commission (4)
(GAIA, Mexican Civil Council for
Sustainable Forestry, the World
Wildlife Fund, Pronatura)
NA EW Mérida: CONAFOR regional (3)
CONANP (1)CONAGUA (2)NGOs
(3) (The Nature Conservancy,
Niños y Crías, Pronatura)Technical
intermediaries (6)EW Tuxtla:
CONAFOR regional (2)Other gov.
(CONANP) (1)NGOs (3) (Ambio,
Pronatura, Conservation
International), Technical
intermediaries (5)
Dimensions
measured
Location, participation in
government programs
Role in designing the eligible
areas and selection criteria
Participation in PSA-H,
Payments for biodiversity,
Protected Area. Socio-
economic indicators including
deforestation risk
Criteria for choosing communities
Analysis
framework
Policyscape: Functional
overlap
Governance analysis: Federal for
the selection criteria and regional
for the eligible areas
Policyscape: PAS-H
spatialization
Governance analysis:
Intermediaries
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.t001
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in two distinct situations: First, for the period ranging from 2004 to 2012, we explored the out-
comes of the negotiation process in charge of designing the selection criteria. We reviewed
existing evidence completed with semi-structured interviews of key competing actors. Second,
we followed the changes in eligible areas in the states of Chiapas and Yucatan through inter-
views with federal and state CONAFOR staff and non-government organisations that had an
active and influential role in the implementation of the program. The states of Chiapas and
Yucatan are both characterized with large tracts of forests, contrasting ecological characteris-
tics, where deforestation is high and forest communities are still abundant and tied to forest
management (Fig 2). Moreover, in the state of Chiapas poverty is a main political issue and for-
est conservation has been strongly enforced through natural protected areas and biosphere
reserves. In the flat state of Yucatan, forests are under the threat of cattle expansion and an
Fig 2. Forest cover and deforestation risk in the states of Yucatan and Chiapas. Sources: Institute of Statisitcs and Geography (INEGI) and Institute of
the Ecology and Climate Change (INECC).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.g002
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expanding informal land market which both have been pushing up deforestation in the last
decade [18,19]. Finally, we explore the motivations and structure of incentives of technical
intermediaries during two expert workshops in the cities of Merida and Tuxtla-Gutiérrez (S1
Appendix).
Descriptive statistical analyses are performed at two levels: At national level, we describe the
functional overlap between environmental (including the PSA-H) and production support pro-
grams and the deforestation risk. We used data from the National Survey of Agrarian and For-
estry Settlements of 2011 (ENNAF), a national survey previously performed in 2002 for a
nationally representative random sample of 324 rural communities. Besides gathering data on
the socio-economic characteristics and forest economic activities, the questionnaire gathers
unique data on what programs are being implemented in each interviewed community. These
programs fall into seven government programs: payments to support traditional maize agricul-
ture (PROCAMPO), payments to support health-care costs of cattle (PROGAN), support to
reforestation and soil restoration in forest areas (PROCOREF), support to forest management
(PRODEFOR), payments for biodiversity (PSA-B), payments for hydrological services
(PSA-H) and natural protected areas (NPAs). All forest programs (PRODEFOR, PROCOREF,
PSA-H and PSA-B) are included under the umbrella of the ProArbol—Renamed as PRONA-
FOR in 2013- macro-program (S1 Table).
Then, at regional level for the states of Yucatan and Chiapas, we compiled a spatially explicit
database of rural and forest communities by linking information from several secondary
sources (S2 Appendix). The database includes information from a total of 2,681 forest commu-
nities, which corresponds to the total number of rural communities in Yucatan and Chiapas
reported in the National Agrarian Register (RAN). The database contains variables such as the
deforestation risk, the level of marginality, the presence of a National Protected Area (NPA),
the vegetation type and land use reported by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography
(INEGI), the presence of hydrological and biodiversity payments and general socio-economic
characteristics such as total number of land holders.
Results
Defining the policyscape at federal level: The negotiation of the selection
criteria and its implications for targeting the deforestation risk
McAffee and Shapiro-Garza [20] and Shapiro-Garza [5] explain how three competing political
agendas have been clashing at federal level to influence the design of PES programs in Mexico.
These agendas include rural social movements–represented by the social movement ¡Movi-
miento El Campo no Aguanta Mas! (MECNAM), NGOs (the World Wildlife Fund, The
Nature Conservancy, national NGOs), the World Bank and the Mexican government. As a
result of the confluence of these actors, Shapiro-Garza [5] describes the design of Mexican PES
programs as a hybrid agenda between neoliberal objectives seeking the creation of markets for
ecosystem services and various political compromises from the ruling party to reach a consen-
sus with the civil society to support peasant communities through cash transfers. Embedded in
such a multifaceted clash of interests from the very origin of the PSA-H creation, the policy
process behind the design of the PSA-H selection criteria has also been characterized by a simi-
lar confrontation of agendas since it started in 2006. Indeed, during the first two years of the
program (2004–2006) communities were enrolled if they were located within hydrological vul-
nerable areas, harbouring large tracts of forests, and located near or within a protected area.
Proximity to cities was also taken into account. Given the lack of a proper scoring system to
sort applicants, CONAFOR administration enrolled forest parcels by the order of arrival of
submissions [11]. The design of a classification system based on added score of a set of
Spatial Policymix and PES in Mexico
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selection criteria was intended to fix this problem and provide an economically efficient system
[11]. In practice, the multi-stakeholder committee established at federal level to decide these
citeria saw the confrontation of two main agendas: One agenda pushed for an economically
efficient scoring system privileging hydrological vulnerability and deforestation risk criteria,
while the other defended pro-social and pro-environment management indicators (e.g. exis-
tence of community conservation areas, community located in a biological corridor, high per-
cent of forest cover). The need to accommodate all demands progressively increased the
number of criteria used, passing from 9 criteria in 2006 to 26 criteria in 2010, and resulting in a
net decline of the influence of hydrological and deforestation risk in the total score. On the con-
trary, social and environmental criteria won pre-eminence: The latter came to represent 80% of
the total possible score in 2010 against 56% in 2006 [11].
What has been the impact of the negotiation process on the overlap between environmental
policies and the deforestation risk? To answer this question we explore what policymixes exist
in our ENNAF national sample of 324 forest communities. Programs analysed are PROGAN,
PROCOREF, PROCAMPO, ProArbol (standing for all forest programs including PSA-H) and
NPAs. To explore statistical association trends among programs we perform a principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) (Table 2). The three factors extracted express three different patterns:
the first factor expresses the simultaneous application of forest management programs and
PSA programs (F1); the second factor shows the coincidence between protected areas and
PSA-H (F2); and the third factor associates PROGAN with reforestation activities and nega-
tively associated with PSA-H (F3). We pursued our analysis by creating clusters of policymixes.
Using a partition-clustering method based on the 3 factors of the PCA, we derived 3 categories
of policymixes to which we added a de facto category created to include those communities
with no other program but production support ones as PROCAMPO and PROGAN. The first
group (C1) corresponds to a policymix where forest programs are strongly associated. This can
be interpreted as both the reflection of the increased weight given to pro-forest selection criteria
and the fact that technical intermediaries might allocate various forest programs to communi-
ties with large tracts of forests. The second group (C2) is a policymix characterised by commu-
nities in protected areas and with a strong presence of forest programs, in particular the PSA-H
program. Again, this policymix is consistent with the increasing weight of environmental crite-
ria in the selection criteria. The last two groups discriminate policymixes made of pure agricul-
tural programs (C4)–support to cattle (PROGAN) and to traditional agriculture
(PROCAMPO)- and (C3) PROGAN with some forest-related programs, in particular the
reforestation program (PROCOREF).
Table 2. Policy-mixes defined by principal component analysis followed by a partition-clustering analysis. The three retained factors after rotation
account for 66% of total variance. Scores in bold indicate PCA loadings higher than 0.3 or grouping frequencies bigger than 50%.
Factor analysis Cluster analysis
Variables F1ProArbol F2NPA&PSA-H F3PROGAN C1ProArbol C2 PA&PSA-H C3PROGAN C4Agr. only*
PROGAN -0.098 0.059 0.855 49% 72% 84% 50%
PROCOREF 0.272 -0.067 0.347 71% 59% 79% 0%
PRODEFOR 0.434 -0.219 0.041 72% 28% 27% 0%
PSA-CABSA 0.460 -0.026 -0.077 59% 26% 6% 0%
PSA-H 0.327 0.414 -0.259 67% 59% 13% 0%
NPA -0.126 0.810 0.101 0% 100% 0% 0%
% communities in categories 28% 12% 33% 27%
* Ag. only: only agriculture and cattle programs (PROCAMPO and PROGAN).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.t002
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Next, we assess the functional overlap between the four identified groups of policymixes
and the deforestation risk of forest communities by plotting the probability of finding each
policymix with regard to an axis accounting for the deforestation risk (Fig 3). The probabil-
ity of finding forest and environmental policymixes (C1 and C2) decreases with the increase
of the deforestation risk. This decrease is sharper for the policymix (C1) grouping all forest
programs including the PSA-H. On the contrary, the probability of finding agricultural pro-
grams (PROCAMPO with or without PROGAN) increases with the deforestation risk.
Although no causality links can be derived from these descriptive statistics, it does indicates
how programmes are spatially grouped since the deforestation risk is a variable spatially ref-
erenced. We observe the existence of three policyscapes: a first one where forest programs,
the PSA-H and NPAs (C1 and C2) overlap in a zone of low deforestation risk; a second one
where productive and reforestation programs (C3) work together regardless the deforesta-
tion risk and a third one where pure productive programs (C4) are associated with a high
deforestation risk.
These patterns suggests that environmental policies, in close association with the PSA-H,
are implemented in forests with low opportunity costs, where forest programs are economically
attractive. This can be the result of both the failure of existing payment levels to attract forest
communities with high deforestation opportunity costs and the result of governance dynamics
that have prioritised social and environmental selection criteria, which correspond to forest
communities with a low risk of deforestation.
Fig 3. Functional overlap of environmental policymixes with the deforestation risk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.g003
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The spatialisation of the PSA-H at regional level: the cases of Chiapas
and Yucatan
PSA-H eligible areas have been in constant change during the 2004–2011 period as a result of
fluctuating political agendas from different stakeholders. Fig 4 illustrates such changes for the
states of Chiapas and Yucatan. The changes over time of the eligible areas respond to a gover-
nance process that experienced three different periods:
The first phase, during the years 2004 to 2006, correspond to the kick-off of the program.
As part of a learning by doing process, in 2004 federal institutions set eligible areas to protect
recharging areas of overexploited and vulnerable aquifers based on the presence of dense forest
and on data from CONAGUA. Additionally, as part of the vertical governance process
described in Fig 1, CONANP demanded that the program support communities in protected
areas in order to compensate them for the costs of complying with conservation rules. Natural
protected areas with dense forest cover where therefore included in the eligible areas. A final
presidential criteria demanded that all states shall be eligible. The lack of overexploited aquifers
in Chiapas and Yucatan meant protected areas in Chiapas and in the dense forests in the south-
ern region of Yucatan became those areas the initially eligible areas. While social movements
put pressure on CONAFOR to enlarge eligible areas in order to include neighbooring commu-
nities, the World Bank convinced CONAFOR officials to add areas nearby cities as they repre-
sented potential future service buyers (Fig 4 year 2005). In 2006, the eligible area remained
unchanged. Overall, the delimitation of eligible areas during this first period responded to insti-
tutional sectorial objectives and the belief that the program would evolve towards a private
market-based scheme.
During the second phase, from 2007 to 2009: In 2007, a major political change came into
the scene. The newly elected president F. Calderón made the fight against poverty one of his
political priorities, with an explicit reference to the support towards rural communities that
assure the provision of forest ecosystem services to the country [21]. Such political committ-
ment provoked a sharp increase in CONAFOR budget and the inclusion of the marginality
Fig 4. Evolution of PSA-HP eligible areas in Yucatan and Chiapas. Source: Authors with CONAFOR
data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.g004
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index as a key indicator to expand PSA-H eligible areas. As a result, the state of Chiapas experi-
enced an expansion of the new eligible areas to regions with high marginality (Fig 4 year 2008).
In addition, CONAFOR staff decided to compact eligible areas and fill gaps is order to facilitate
administrative procedures. In 2008 CONAFOR included the demand from CONABIO to
include mangroves and biodiversity corridors. This second period was characterised by an
overall expansion of the eligible area pushed by the political will to include marginal rural
communities.
The third phase, from the year 2010 to 2012 saw a major administrative change. In 2010,
the biodiversity and hydrological payments for environmental services were officially merged
into one program, divided in six spatially different regions: The first 3 ones with the highest
payments were devoted to hydrological services, whereas the last 3 ones with smaller payments
were under biodiversity services eligible areas (Fig 4 year 2011). CONAFOR assigned applica-
tions to one or another payment type depending on the geographical location of communities.
This merging process responded to a budget decrease for biodiversity payments compared to
the larger budget for hydrological services and from the pressure from NGOs and social move-
ments that did not want the payments for biodiversity protection to disappear [5]. In 2011,
CONAFOR decided to eliminate eligible areas that did not apply to the program in previous
years in order to prioritise those that expressed their will to participate but were not eligible.
The year 2012 was a political election year and the eligible areas remained unchanged.
How have these changes affected the spatialization of the program in terms of targeting for-
est at risk, poor populations and its association with other environmental programs such as
NPAs? We compare the means of key socio-economic indicators from communities within
and without the eligible areas from 2004 to 2010, the latter being the year when biodiversity
and hydrological eligible areas were merged (Table 3, S2 Table). In the state of Chiapas, we find
that differences between eligible and non-eligible areas are fairly stable across years. Eligible
areas have been characterised since 2004 by communities with larger areas, within natural pro-
tected areas and with higher marginality and percentage of forest cover. Population density
does not show important differences. Nevertheless, the deforestation risk scores significantly
higher in communities outside eligible areas than within. The state of Yucatan shows a similar
yet less noticeable pattern, with eligible forests being in larger communities with more forest,
less populated and with a smaller risk of deforestation. Marginality shows a higher rate after
the year 2010. An increase in the number of eligible communities occurs in 2007 when the tar-
geting of marginal communities expands eligible areas.
However, eligible areas are just a filter for selecting communities. Enrolled communities
need the assistance of technical intermediaries (TI) to participate in the program. In order to
capture their possible role in defining the spatialization of the PSA-H, we assess the characteri-
sitics of enrolled vs non-enrolled communities within eligible areas (Table 3, S3 Table). In the
state of Chiapas, enrolled communities have more forest, were more frequently associated with
natural protected areas and had lower deforestation risk than non-enrolled communities.
These differences suggest that the establishment of eligible areas in Chiapas was particularly
efficient at targeting marginal communities. The strong association of enrolled communities
with low deforestation risk and larger tracts of forests suggests that technical intermediaries in
Chiapas chose communities where the total amount of payments would be important–i.e. large
tracts of forests- and presumably easy to be accepted by the assembly–i.e. low deforestation
risk-. Moreover, the statistically significant highest frequency of NPAs in enrolled communities
also reflects thepreference of technical intermediaries to target communities within or in the
border of NPAs. TI have thus strengthened the preference of eligible areas to overlap with
NPAs. In the state of Yucatan, enrolled communities have a lower population density and a
higher marginal index. The percentage of the community area under forest is not statistically
Spatial Policymix and PES in Mexico
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different, in line with the fact that eligible areas had already targeted densely forested areas. No
difference in means were also found in the deforestation risk.
To crosscheck the statistical results we explored, during the two expert workshops with
stakeholders, what structure of incentives guided the choice of TI with regard to what commu-
nities they would prefer to support. In Yucatan TI were mainly small consulting firms special-
ised in rural development. They expressed a preference to work with communities with large
forests and fewer households. They also prioritise communities where governance is transpar-
ent, with a good leadership. Finally, they prefer to exclude communities where forest is under
high deforestation pressure, near cities or affected by future infrastructure developments (e.g.
roads, pipelines), since thay are aware that payments will not compete with potential gains
from deforestation. In the state of Chiapas TI are composed of environmental and biodiversity
conservation NGOs whose agenda is tied to supporting conservation and development activi-
ties in NPAs, areas where they have a working record.
Such behavior is in line with the objective of minimising contracting transaction costs (costs
of gathering information, reaching and convincing the communities, administrative proce-
dures for submitting the dossier, signature of the contract) [12] but also to limit uncertainty
factors–as an unpredicted source of transaction costs, in line with the concept of bounded
rationality [22]. From the intermediaries’ rationale of selecting forest communities we identify
two major sources of uncertainty. A first source is associated with the reaction of communities
Table 3. Difference in means for eligible vs non-eligible and PSA-H vs no PSA-H communities in the states of Chiapas and Yucatan.
All state Within eligible area
Eligible communities Non eligible communities Communities with PSA-H Communities without PSA-H
CHIAPAS
N 1166 784 131 1035
Criteria
risk
deforestion
2.40 3.00 * 1.76 2.52 *
% forested
land
58% 31% * 73% 56% *
marginality
index
0.53 0.14 * 0.50 0.55
NPA 26% 10% * 59% 23% *
Community characteristics
size (ha) 2198 1428 * 2806 2126
pop. density 0.51 0.88 0.35 0.53
YUCATAN
N 250 481 59 191
Criteria
risk
deforestation
3.50 3.70 * 3.56 3.46
% forest 78% 77% 87% 87%
marginality -0.09 0.01 0.37 -0.23 *
NPA 17% 2% * 17% 17%
Community characteristics
size (ha) 3978 2500 * 4827 3716
pop. density 0.38 1.90 0.07 0.48 *
*: signiﬁcant at 90% from 2004 to 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152514.t003
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after they are enrolled in the program and receive the first payment. The exclusion or inclusion
of households within a community in formal internal agreements–making them eligible or not
for payments- can create tensions and conflicts if the internal distribution of the payment is
seen as unfair [23]. Working with a reduced number of households reduces the risk of conflicts
and TI have also the capacity to monitor households and undertake a more accurate commu-
nity governance diagnostic. In many cases communities under good governance are well
known among neighbours and local institutions and in some cases are formally recognised
through government certificates, such as CONANP certification for communities implement-
ing voluntary conservation reserves (http://www.conanp.gob.mx/difusion/comunicado.php?
id_subcontenido=75). Working in areas where intermediaires have a working record–i.e. in
NPAs- also disminishes this source of uncertainty while being able to adopt a long term sup-
port strategy. A second source of uncertainty is related to the mistrust towards the capacity of
the administration to assure funds for the whole 5-year cycle of payments. TI will prefer select-
ing communities with large forests in order to get larger payments and bigger commissions for
their services.
Discussion
National government PES programs entail large and complex governance structures involving
multiple sequential implementation steps at different geographic scales. For policy targeting to
assure program objectives, the multi-level governance has to be aligned to program objectives
all along the policy process [24]. The Mexican PSA-H program is a good project-specific case
study to assess the impact of the policy process in targeting outcomes. At the federal level, the
probability of finding environmental policymixes along a deforestation risk axis shows a clear
spatial segmentation between agricultural and forest programs, the latter negatively associated
with the deforestation risk. Such segmentation reflects both the evident matching of programs
with land use profitability (and therefore opportunity costs) and the effect of governance
dynamics that shaped the design of the selection criteria. This interpretation, nevertheless,
must be taken with cautioun since the national sample we use is relatively small (324 commu-
nities) and only for the year 2011. A more robust assessment would benefit from panel data in
order to assess the concordance between the evolution of selection criteria, policymixes and the
deforestation risk on a yearly basis.
The selection criteria operates as a filter within the eligible areas to enroll best-suited
communities. The eligible area, settled at federal level after consulting different government
and non-government stakeholders, increased along the years as a result of the integration of
more objectives–in a similar manner as the design of the selection criteria- and a sharp bud-
get increase under the political will of the F. Calderon presidency. Interestingly, the mean
values of key socio-economic criteria in eligible areas remained fairly similar across the
yearswhich suggests a resilient eligibility strategy from the federal forest administration
since its implementation. Nevertheless, the spatialization of the PSA-H emerges only after
technical intermediaries come into action. Existing theorethical models on the influence of
technical intermediaries of the effectiveness of PES point out that they select communities
mainly based on the minimisation of transaction costs and sources of uncertainty [12,22].
By targeting communities with low opportunity costs, large tracts of forests (i.e. in marginal
geographic areas) and which are not densely populated, TI have strengthened the underlying
targeting pattern arising from the designed eligible areas with only small modifications in
the type of communities enrolled. This result can be explained as a combination of two fac-
tors. First, the choice of eligible areas seem to have coped well with institutional objectives,
in terms of reinforcing protected areas, large forests and more marginalised communities.
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Forests with high deforestation risks have been systematically left aside. Second, the selec-
tion criteria and the standard assessment for allocating money to communities–based on the
total number of hectares inscribed- is aligned with having low transaction costs (i.e. increas-
ing the cost-effectiveness of their support) while minimising sources of uncertainty. At a
qualitative level, we also observed that TI that have kept the fidelity of communities over the
years have proven to have a long term vision of rural development. Indeed, in the early
cohorts of the PSA-H, some TI tricked communities asking for more money or more pay-
ments than those expressed in CONAFOR implementation rules. A complementary study
conducted by the authors in 77 communities in Southern Yucatan revealed that TI used to
get paid on a yearly basis an average of 11% of the payment received by communities [23].
With the passing of time, only TI that have built long lasting trust with communities have
been able to endure in the sector. As a result, they have also acquired a prospective vision of
what development and conservation trajectories are needed for each community, and what
programs are best suited. A quantitative analysis explaining how the structure of incentives
of TI predicts communities characteristics and environmental outcomes would be needed to
strengthen these first results. Moreover, since programs interact among themselves and with
conditions of the ground driven by governance dynamics, our study proposes a methodol-
ogy to deal with such complexity. Forthcoming studies in Mexico need to combine qualita-
tive and quantitative spatially explicit datasets on ongoing productive and conservation
programs in order to disentangle with more detail the causality links between these different
processes.
Conclusion
Large public PES programs rely on targeting to assure that political and institutional objectives
are met. In the present paper we assess the impact of the multi-level governance of the Mexican
program of payments for hydrological services on the targeting process for enrolling communi-
ties with high deforestation risk and marginality as the main two policy objectives. We combine
the policyscape framework with a governance analysis at national and regional level for the
states of Chiapas and Yucatan. At national level, PSA-H implementation can’t cope with high
deforestation risk areas where land uses are specialized towards agricultural production. As a
consequence, PSA-H is implemented together with and reinforcing already existing conserva-
tion programs like NPAs, and forest management programs. At regional level in the states of
Yucatan and Chiapas, we explore the socio-economic characteristics of communities within
eligible and enrolled areas. In both states, both eligible and enrolled communities fall in areas
with extensive forests and associated with low deforestation risk. In Chiapas, eligible and
enrolled areas include also high marginal zones, as a result of a political will. Finally, technical
intermediaries seek to maximize profits while minimizing sources of uncertainty: They priori-
tize communities with large forests, reinforcing this specific feature of eligible areas, but also
communities less densely populated and with good governance, in order to minimize negotia-
tions costs and uncertainty with respect to the behavior of contracted parties. The combination
of a quantitative policyscape framework with multi-level governance analysis is a useful tool to
clarify the complex interactions between governance dynamics and policy spatial implementa-
tion outcomes in order to assess the degree of syncronisation between governance dynamics,
policy objectives and landscape characteristics.
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